From March through July, as the ground warms and unstable air masses move in from above, these violent phenomena can appear in seconds with winds that can reach 300 mph and leave paths of destruction that can exceed a mile in width and 50 miles in length. The southern states normally receive the first major tornado activity of the season, then in late spring and early summer, the activity moves in a north-easterly direction.

Emergency managers, especially in tornado alley, the geographic area of high tornado activity covering Iowa, Oklahoma, Nebraska, Kansas, Arkansas, Louisiana and Mississippi, constantly are working with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and local weather services to perfect early warning systems that employ everything from air-raid sirens to e-mails, text messages and automated phone dialers.

The problem is that in many cases, the weather news may issue a warning, but people go about their business until a tornado is sighted. By the time a tornado is seen, there may be no time to warn people in the immediate path. So, if we know the threat and we know the vulnerability, how do we mitigate the potentially lethal threat for the individual homeowner?

For people living in apartment buildings, more often than not there are basements that residents can access to provide below-ground safety in the event of a tornado. Individual homeowners tend to have a more difficult time when in the immediate path of these whirling bulldozers. The trick is to have an easily accessible space that can withstand extreme wind pressure, the weight of a house or tree falling on it, and be strong enough to withstand projectiles striking it as if shot from a cannon. The space does not have to be large and does not need to be provisioned, as the tornado will pass in 10 to 15 minutes.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency suggests building a “safe room.”

These safe rooms have no windows, a door that opens inward, are anchored to the slab or foundation and must be made of materials that can withstand wind, weight, and projectiles.

The typical safe room can cost anywhere from $2,500 to $5,000 to construct.

There also are a number of companies that manufacture safe rooms that can be built to specifications, delivered and installed for less than $4,000.

The Dupont Storm Room with Kevlar is a well-known manufacturer who employes the technology used in bullet-proof vests. Tornado Safe Room makes a popular unit that has been tested to withstand wind speeds up to 450 mph. One of the first manufacturers of manufactured Safe Rooms is The Family Safe, which also will build to spec, deliver and install.

These units can be incorporated into new construction or retro-fitted into existing structures. All of these manufactured safe rooms have been found to be 99 percent effective and greatly decrease anxiety for owners living in areas of high tornado activity.

For more information regarding tornado safety and what to do before, during and after a tornado, view FEMA’s tip sheet here.

Lynette Hoke/DVIDS

[Editor's note: This is the final segment of a three-part series on Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives.]

Recovery Actions-Technical Decontamination

As the emergency decon process comes to a close for chemical attack/HAZMAT incident, technical decontamination of the affected area(s) should take place. Factors such as the classification of an agent (non-persistent/persistent), the purity and the type of agent will determine how a cleanup is conducted.

Since non-persistent agents dissipate, decon operations can take place quicker than that of  persistent agents. As we saw in the Tokyo chemical sarin attack in 1995, the exceptionally powerful air exchange system in the subway stations assisted in reducing in the number of casualties.

This proves as a good lesson learned for the United States—both transportation nodes as well as office buildings should provide its tenants this service. Authorities and building owners responsible for operating these venues have a responsibility to protect the public from these types of dangers.

The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) provides technical guidance on this topic in their publication: “Guidance for Filtration and Air-Cleaning Systems to Protect Building Environments from Airborne Chemical, Biological, or Radiological Attacks.”

Persistent agents often linger, depending a number of factors such as temperature, purity and agent. Technical decon services can be contracted out to private firms as long as they are provided the proper information regarding the chemical threat and hold the proper certifications for the services that are to be conducted.

Planning Ahead

Any lead agency having these enormous responsibilities in preparing for and conducting a mass decon has to look at this task on a daily basis.

There is virtually no research being conducted on how to effectively organize and manage such a mass decontamination effort. Research is needed to determine the optimal responder/patient ratio, how large an area is needed to decon 50, 500 and 5,000 people, what level of medical training is required for the personnel performing decon and how much medical care should be given in the warm zone as opposed to the cold zone or at the hospital.

The military model primarily addresses how to handle young healthy soldiers already wearing protective clothing and respiratory protection, and is not directly applicable to a heterogeneous, unprotected and undisciplined population.

Although a State National Guard’s Civil Support Team (CST) and additional federal resources may be of assistance, how long will it take for those entities to arrive?

If you’re a manager within a municipality, you have to ask yourself what effective resourcing can I provide to the public within my jurisdiction, pending the arrival of the state and federal governments? Conducting joint training exercises with these agencies, as well as the private sector on a quarterly basis, can help alleviate some of these concerns.

Many first responder agencies conduct some form of CBRNE training with varying standards and a minimal amount of training. Usually specialized units (the few) receiving the most technical schooling to pass onto their counterparts. Your training should be tailored and standardized following guidelines set forth by the Center of Domestic Preparedness.

Here are just a few questions you should ask in evaluating your agency’s capabilities:

How many times a year does your agency conduct individual CBRNE/HAZMAT protective measures?

How is your communication practices with other agencies? How would you grade them?

When did you last perform a Joint Exercise with various layers of government, emergency management and support agencies?

Are all your personnel trained on NIMS and/or their local equivalent systems?

Are personnel familiar with their personal equipment and Doffing procedures?

How many times a year does your agency conduct decon procedures as a team/unit?

How do you measure what you have learned?

What types of PPE are used in your agency?

What levels of PPE are in your inventory to meet a given threat?

How many people can you decon at a given site?

Do you have support personnel (medical, sanitation, etc.)?

Who is the lead agency in your jurisdiction?

How long will it take for that agency to assist you?

What agency can provide relief operations for you?

Does your agency have a robust backup agency in a Mutual Aid Agreement?

Do your local hospitals have decon facilities?

Resources

There are many training resources and products out there to assist your agency in both identifying threats and dealing with them.

Terrorism Response videos can assist your agency’s instructors to make key points through the use of this visual aid to your personnel. This type of training is cost effective, beneficial and not time consuming. See more here. Hands-on training should also take place after the classroom portion is complete.

Obtaining timely intelligence always is critical in this business and so is identifying levels of radiation caused due to an unforeseen accident or that of a terrorist incident. The use of a K8 electronic alarming device provides its user with the instant feedback on the presence of gamma and X radiation (nuclear waste, RDDs/dirty bombs). Law enforcement and first responders actively can detect a large variety of radioactive hazards throughout their communities and can double as counter terrorism measure 24/7. More here.

Most fire departments have some sort of agreement with their counterpart the police department when it comes to handling bomb threat response. However, if FD gets on the scene first, they can provide mitigation actions by simply throwing a blanket over a potential RDD, pending the arrival of the bomb squad. See more here.

[Read part one here. Read part two here.]

Patsy Lynch/FEMA

Operation Safeguard, a New York State initiative (undoubtedly under another name in the other 49), targets terrorists by educating business owners on the signs of terror activity.

Law enforcement officials hope that the business community in rural areas may be able to provide a wealth of intelligence information on suspicious behavior. No particular behavior or business was singled out, but one particular segment of the business world that law enforcement agents must get a better handle on is self-storage facilities.

Of course business owners whose facilities may carry fertilizer or beauty parlor supplies are particularly of interest, considering fertilizer, namely ammonium nitrate (ANFO), was used in the Oklahoma City bombing, as well as hydrogen peroxide, an important ingredient in the popular terrorist’s weapon, hexamethylene triperoxide diamine, or HMDT for short, storage facilities are where the criminal operates.

Terrorists from Timothy McVeigh to the first World Trade Center bombers showed a penchant for self-storage facilities as a staging area for terrorist attacks. In each one of those instances, the facility was within a relatively short distance from the intended target.  Terrorists rarely live or operate near the target for obvious reasons—they need to avoid detection and, remote areas may be a good area for law enforcement to concentrate their intelligence-gathering efforts.

If a large-scale attack was to be planned, one can surmise that any operational or logistical planning would take place in a rural or remote area. Self-storage facilities offer terrorists unfettered 24-hour access that allows them to plan virtually unnoticed.

Here are some ideas that law enforcement officials can use to help build a better intelligence-gathering tree from the business segment of self-storage areas that may disrupt planning operations:

Make a list and map each storage facility in their jurisdiction;

Have police sector cars make directed patrols to storage facilities on each tour;

If a facility has a clerk, require officers to check in;

Ask storage owners to ensure that proper photo identification is presented and photocopied at the time for each rental;

Make sure that a credit card is used to secure the room, even when a customer insists on paying cash;

Ask owners to report any behavior that may be deemed suspicious, i.e. numerous late-night deliveries, the off loading of barrels commonly used to store chemicals, leaks, strange odors, etc.

If law enforcement can take the use of self-storage facilities off the table for terror operatives, they can deal a blow to the logistical aspects of planning a large-scale attack in a major metropolitan city.

Antwain Graham/DVIDS

[Editor's note: This is part two of three in a series on Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive preparedness. Part three will publish April 7.]

Since the response issues, identification and procedures in handling CBRNE issues vary, this article will address each of these concerns individually, followed by recovery actions and planning ahead.

Nuclear Attack

Although nuclear weapons pose the least credible threat since they are both difficult to obtain as well as employ, this type of threat must be considered. In May 1997, former Soviet National Security Advisor Alexander Lebed, addressed a U.S. Congressional committee in a closed door session and stated, “There were approximately a hundred small nuclear weapons referred to as suitcase nukes unaccounted for when the Soviet Union collapsed.” According to some repoorts, these devices probably were replicated by the Russians after the Special Atomic Demolition Munition (SADM) found in the U.S. weapons inventory during the 1960s through the 1980s.

On Sept. 7, 1997, in an interview with CBS newsmagazine’s correspondent Steve Kroft, Lebed repeated that 100 of 250 suitcase nuclear-sized bombs were missing and no longer in control of the Russian military. Over the next several years, the controversy raged as to the possibilities of terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda obtaining a suitcase nuclear device.

The ability to acquire radioactive materials from any number of industrial, educational or scientific sources and the combination of this material to produce an explosion must remain a national concern to protect the populace.

An attack on a nuclear facility provides another means of causing a radiological contamination to a widescale area. Terrorists may breach security through a direct assault to an installation or gain entry by means of collusion with existing employees.

The results of a nuclear attack would prove devastating to the population at large, as well effect the economy, the dispensing of proper medical care and ability of municipalities and states to properly govern. The 1986 Chernobyl accident at a nuclear power station—although not a terrorist incident—proves this theory true.

The best defense in this matter relies on a good offense. Continuous aggressive intelligence and counter-intelligence activities conducted by various governmental agencies is the best option to mitigate these type of threats.

Explosives (High Yield)

Terrorists continue to use  high yield explosives and incendiary devices as a  prime choice of weapons from their arsenal as a means of intimidation. In April 1995, a domestic terrorist parked a truck bomb at the base of the Alfred P. Murrah building and detonated the truck bomb with a timed fuse. High explosives are designed to shatter and destroy; this process is initiated by the shock of a detonator.

High explosives fall into three categories: Primary (various mixed chemical compounds), secondary (TNT, PETN, C4 and dynamite to name a few well known to the public), and tertiary (ANFO, used in Oklahoma City bombing in 1995).

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) usually are constructed from available resources of the designer. The most common explosive of of this type is a pipe bomb that is filled with black or smokeless powders.

After the events of Sept. 11 became clear by the carnage unleashed by al-Qaeda, the U.S. quickly learned how their operatives had factored in the use of jet fuel as a major component of their means of attack. With this said, liquified natural gas (LNG) must also be considered as a significant potential threat for high yield explosives. A Sandia National Laboratories report considered four ways of a terrorist attack against a tanker: (1) ramming with another large ship or vessel, (2) triggered explosion, such as a sub-surface mine, (3) an external assault with an explosive charge and (4) a hijacking.

A high yield explosion likely is to overwhelm a municipality’s resources within a short period of time. It is imperative municipality leaders establish, train and maintain an effective mutual aid program with agency counterparts in their surrounding counties. Other counties can assist your local government in maintaining the continuity of emergency operations and provide needed support to an affected area.

Secondary Devices/Scene Control

Emergency managers must  anticipate the possible detonation of a secondary explosive device when one has gone off and their personnel are responding to the scene.

The bombing of an occupied Sandy Springs family-planning clinic in Atlanta in January 1997 targeted responding emergency personnel and investigators from both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, after the initial blast. One month later in February 1997, a similar incident took place in the same city when a nightclub was bombed. A secondary device was discovered. Apparently, first responders were the target when a backpack later was discovered again after the initial blast had taken place.

Scene control is critical. The initial units responding to the blast site must establish control—regardless of agency. Once law enforcement entities begin to arrive, they can assist other fire and EMS entities in establishing and taking control of perimeters. Proper coordination with the police/sheriff’s bomb squad is key in addressing the possibility of an actual secondary device and the advancement toward the inner perimeter for vital reasons.

To ensure safety of both first responders and properly retrieving injured victims to safe areas, this coordination should take place before accessing the inner perimeter or seat of the blast. Most fire departments have an agreement with their police counterparts to await the arrival of the bomb squad to address explosive devices.

Inter-agency drills for explosion scenarios should be part of any municipality’s training curriculum. Getting each agency to work through this type of joint exercise together will better assist emergency managers in facilitating each agency’s interoperability with one another. Better communication and common bonds likely will be achieved to support one another during times of crisis where time is of the essence.

Read part one here.

However, even before an EM entity puts its response plan into motion, there must be some tried and true organizational principles put into place in order to have the most effective leadership team possible.

Like the multiple pieces of a giant jigsaw puzzle that we must carefully and painstakingly select and fit into the puzzles parameters, so must we exercise the same patience and precision in building our emergency management leadership team.

The sound structural makeup of an organization facilitates the accomplishing of tasks by its members, assists in achieving the purposes for which it was established and nurtures an atmosphere of effectiveness and efficiency. When considering individuals for leadership positions within an organization, a few desirable character traits should be investigated.

First, an individual must be able to think clearly and to be able to make a decision under duress. Wavering to and fro, incapable of making a decision, will waste valuable time and only will compound the problem at hand. When lives are at stake, time is of the essence. One cannot waste valuable time in an emergency with indecision.

Secondly, can the individual articulate his or her thoughts to others in a clear, concise and logical manner? This is of paramount importance. If you cannot articulate to others what needs to be done, then one should not expect things to get done, as one wants them. In addition, one very important and overlooked aspect of communication is the ability to be a good listener. Listening is a key element to effective two-way communication. This means fully focusing and comprehending what is being communicated to you and not just “selectively” hearing what you want.

Along this same line, people skills are vital. Does the candidate possess above average or minimal interpersonal skills? (Or for that matter, do they possess any “people skills.”) If one can’t relate to others, how can they be an integral part of a team concept of leadership? In order for co-workers to have confidence in the ability to lead, one must be a good salesperson. Being able to sell your programs and ideas in order that others “buy in” is a necessity for someone being considered for a leadership position.

A leader should be willing to look elsewhere for answers, especially when conventional wisdom won’t suffice. By going “outside the box,” one may get the answer they so desperately need.

Finally, are the individuals you wish to put into your leadership team trustworthy and loyal? Do they believe in you and your ideas? Are their ways your ways? Will they be cohesive or divisive?

With that being said, I am all too aware of the reality of nepotism, political favors and cronyism. These beasts are destructive and will obliterate morale in an instant. They do not allow an organization to reach its full potential and, most times, are counterproductive. Having no choice on the individuals you want to bring on board is not the way to build your “dream team.”

Unfortunately, the aforementioned are all too alive and well today in organizations throughout America. And the result is a risk organizations just can’t afford.

Eric Rutherford/DVIDS

[Editor's note: This is part one of a three-part series. The second part will publish April 1.]

No single agency at any level of government has the technical capability or authority to respond independently to mitigate the consequences of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD) attack within Anytown, U.S.A. Well-publicized terrorist incidents, such as the Tokyo chemical sarin attack in 1995, as well as domestic attacks in Oklahoma City and the Northeast corridor of the U.S. during Sept. 11, 2001, implore emergency managers today to capitalize on these hard lessons learned. Is a community located on U.S. soil really prepared for a another WMD event?

A Central Intelligence Agency report states that terrorist attacks in the future would likely be small scale, incorporating improvised delivery means, or easily produced or obtained chemicals, toxins, or radiological substances. Nontheless, leaders of municipalities and emergency managers must be ready to tackle the very possible threat of various types of effects caused by CBRNE to a given population.

Emergency Mass Casualty Decon Triage

I often wondered how long it would take a chemical company in the military to decontaminate an Infantry Battalion (combat arms entity of the U.S. Army consisting of approximately 800 Soldiers) during actual (not simulated) combat operations. I’m sure with some controls in place, the decontamination process could be completed in under 24 hours, including the movement of troops to the decon site thus refitting them for a new  combat mission. Now, let’s change the scenario to an uncontrolled environment and an adhoc size decon site. Do you see the problems? Decontamination capabilities of a given site will be quickly overwhelmed by the number of persons to decontaminate.

“The challenges of emergency decontamination include the speed at which the decontamination operation must occur in order to save lives, the number of victims involved, and the limitations imposed by the availability of proper Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) to safely do the job,” according to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Preparedness Directorate Office of Grants and Training.

Emergency organizations tasked with the responsibilities of managing a WMD situation must effectively establish containment of both the crowd as well as the agent. The rapid responses of emergency apparatus with decon capabilities that will provide showers for the public must be robust. This is a crucial event in setting up your decontamination line. Possible decon sites should be earmarked within your jurisdiction to accommodate equipment and alleviate congestion of arriving personnel if at all possible. This is a key factor in urban and suburban areas with high populations. These sites should be categorized as law enforcement sensitive.

The initial triage of patients should be conducted by EMTs in the hot zone if these personnel have the ability to do so, depending on the number of victims. Otherwise the coordination with the medical community in prioritizing the victims medical condition will have to start at the decon line. Victims at the decon line will be categorized as either ambulatory or nonambulatory. All personnel who have the potential of coming in contact to exposed casualties must wear personal protective equipment. PPEs must be matched to the various types of environments in which emergency responders are working in. For example, an OSHA Level B chemical protective clothing can provide protection to those personnel working in the Warm zone.

As time progresses the response of state and federal resources will provide assistance to the exposed area. The National Response Framework (NRF) is designed to provide a unified joint response from all federal agencies to any type of terrorist incident, such as the explosion of a “dirty bomb” or the release of anthrax. For some municipalities outside state or federal resources may arrive simultaneously but, for some rural areas, some time may elapse before assistance arrives. This must be factored into your municipalities’ overall contingency plan for providing vital services.

Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Explosives (CBRNE)

Since the response issues, identification and procedures in handling CBRNE issues vary, this article will address each of these concerns individually followed by recovery actions and planning ahead.

Chemical Attack Concerns

Maj. Gen. Stephen V. Reeves, the former Joint Program Executive Officer for Chemical and Biological Defense at the Pentagon, reminds emergency responders not “…to lose sight of the chemical threat, given the volume of toxic industrial chemicals and toxic industrial materials (TIC/TIM) present all around the United States.” Widely published information on the Web, he also points out, “magnifies the challenge, because it gives the bad guys the how-to ability to make chemical agents.” See The Chemical Threat and the State of Chemical Preparedness available at Domestic Preparedness.

Chemical Warfare Agents can be obtained and utilized by terrorist organizations. These chemical warfare agents are categorized as being: nerve, blood, blister, and choking agents. Identifying the type of chemical agent dispersed can be attained through the use of gas chronometer/mass spectronometer and MINICAMS. The findings will assist first responders in rendering the appropriate aid to victims. Chemical agents are classified as being persistent or non-persistent. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) states treatment for chemical attacks is administered by public health agencies and first responders by using treatment modalities “based on syndromic categories (e.g., burns and trauma, cardiorespiratory failure, neurologic damage, and shock).” More here.

This classification determines the length of time an agent will remain in or near a target area after its dissemination. These classifications will be addressed later as they relate to technical decontamination during the recovery phase of an incident.

Biological Attack Concerns

Effects of biological agents present another real concern for emergency managers unlike that of chemical agents. A biological agent normally incubates for a period of time in the host’s body before displaying any symptoms. Its subtle symptoms of an ordinary sickness can temporarily hide their real effects on a given population. Hospital emergency rooms will more than likely be flooded by patients suffering from its effects until a trend is discovered. More here.

Biological agents have a variety of affects on human beings depending on the dosage received and the route of entry. The range of effect can vary from mild effects to death. Biological warfare agents can be broken down into three groups: pathogens, toxins and bioregulators. Since bioregulators are chemical compounds, they can be used in conjunction with other CBRN in order to mask their identification and impair the proper medical treatment for its victims.

Radiological Attack Concerns

Effects of a radiological dispersion device (RDD), also known as a “dirty bomb,” would produce injuries from heat, force of the explosion, debris and radiological dust. A dirty bomb consists of radioactive material attached to a conventional bomb. Upon confirming the initial fatalities after an explosion can future radiation be determined. This will be dependent upon the grade of radioactive material and the amount that has been released.

The health risks of exposure to radioactive material are dependent upon several factors: the amount of radiation received, known as the dose and the length of time over in which the dose is received. Radiation generally penetrates the body when exposed to beta particles and gamma rays.

Beta particles can be a hazard to both bare skin and eyes by causing burns. If ingested or inhaled, damage to internal organs will occur in its victims. Gamma radiation travels hundreds of meters in open air and penetrates most objects. Gamma rays penetrate tissue farther than do beta or alpha particles. Gamma rays can cause death. Alpha particles do not damage living tissue when outside the body however, when alpha-emitting atoms are inhaled or swallowed, they especially are damaging because they transfer relatively large amounts of ionizing energy to living cells. Damage to internal organs will occur in victims.

First responders are reminded to utilize time, distance and shielding (TDS) in order to reduce or eliminate the exposure of radiation. Emergency managers must enforce this safety measure with their personnel upon their arrival to the scene. Another possible threat in responding to a “dirty bomb” incident is the issue of a secondary explosive device against first responders. This type of response will be addressed later under explosive attack concerns.

[Author's note: In 2002, suspected al-Qaeda member Jose Padilla was arrested in Chicago for his role in a plot to explode an RDD in the United States.]

Learn more about “dirty bomb” protection devices here.

Martin Sutovec, Slovakia/caglecartoons.com

Israel is known for an incredibly tough air-safety security program. In the past three decades, for example, no EL AL aircraft has been attacked by terrorists. There also never has been an aircraft hijacked leaving Ben Gurion airport. By contrast, Delta Airlines has had eight aircrafts hijacked from the United States, prior to Sept. 11, 2001.

When a passenger is at an Israeli airport, he/she will not be asked to remove his/her shoes or be body scanned. The airport security model in Israel is a personnel-based model. The airport security system in Israel is one of the best in the world, based on the number of security breaches, bombing attempts and hijackings.

The U.S., by contrast, has a completely different airport security model. It is a technology-based model, heavily weighted in favor of scanning devices and computer databases.

Critics state that the Israeli model only works because of the diminutive size of the commercial air travel industry in Israel. It has been said that the “Israelification” of U.S. airports is impossible due to the volume of people and aircraft involved. EL AL, for example, has 38 aircraft and moves around two million passengers per year. Delta Airlines, by comparison, operated a fleet of 743 aircraft in 2009 and moved more than 47 million passengers.

The issue boils down to a comparison of two models in two vastly different applications. Can a moderately trained, poorly paid individual operating a device do a better job of airport security than a highly trained, well-paid individual not relying on a device? Also, can the prevailing model work for high- and low-volume applications?

The U.S. airport security system is a device-based system that does not employ a layered security model. When one drives to a U.S. airport, the only security personnel he/she will see before entering the terminal will be security guards at the departure and arrival access points, hurrying drivers away from the terminal curb. This is to prevent car bombs from being exploded into what are typically multi-story glass facades. No one will meet security before purchasing your ticket. The first layer of security will be at the transition point between the ticket purchase area and access to various airline gates. This formal and guarded transition area is what is known as a “hard” layer of security. This is the predominant layer in the U.S. airport security model, where identification is matched to ticket information, shoes and belts are removed, carry-on luggage is scanned and individuals may be segregated for further questioning and inspection.

Currently, 19 U.S. airports also employ body-scanning machines. The only other security layer is at the boarding gate, where identification again is matched to ticket information. U.S. airport security personnel currently undergo 40 hours of online training and 60 hours of on-the-job training.  There is an annual attrition rate of approximately 20 percent in the ranks of TSA screening personnel.

By contrast, the Israeli airport security model is a personnel-based model that heavily employs a layered security structure. At Ben Gurion, the Israelis employ a six-layer security structure—four soft layers and two hard layers. The first layer is encountered upon entering any airport access road. An individual will have to pass through an exterior gate and answer two questions: “How are you?” and “Where are you coming from?” The security personnel are trained to look for any signs of anxiety in this initial exchange. Upon passing through the exterior gate, the second layer of security is encountered at various interior gates near choke points and significant buildings. Again, the two simple questions are answered and the response compared to the first interchange. The third layer is an exchange with security personnel who roam the departure drop-off points and parking areas. Again, simple questions are asked. Three layers of security are employed before entering the terminal building.

Upon entering the terminal building, in an area called the Greeting Hall, a fourth soft layer is encountered by security agents questioning travelers at random. Departing passengers then move to upper level floors to a formal airline check-in desk and the first hard layer of security. This is a formal stop where documents are checked and trip information is inquired about by a trained interviewer while luggage is scanned. The sixth layer is a body and carry-on baggage inspection, the second hard layer and the final layer of the security structure.

Logan International Airport in Boston is the first U.S. airport to attempt a hybrid model of airport security, employing the strengths of the Israeli model and the U.S. model in a way that accommodates the high volume demand inherent in the U.S. commercial air travel industry.

Logan trained 100 state troopers in Behavior Pattern Recognition (BPR) and deployed them inside and around the airport. The troopers engage any traveler that catches their attention with seemingly innocuous questions about their stay in Boston. Any suspicious behavior is forwarded to security personnel at the screening checkpoint. If there is further suspicion at the screening checkpoint, the passenger will be segregated and questioned. This is the first attempt at employing BPR in the U.S.

Many lawmakers worldwide consider BPR to be glorified profiling and argue in favor of scanning devices, which also have been declared by lawmakers to be an invasion of privacy. Passengers at Logan may legally refuse to answer casual questions asked by state troopers. Logan has had many inquiries about their new hybrid plan, in which there has been limited application at other U.S. airports.

There is very little political will to bring the more confrontational Israeli system to the U.S. Claims of racial profiling, raising the caliber of training airport security workers and restricting commuter access and convenience are all reasons for U.S. officials to stick with the current system.

This, however, will change when the next Sept. 11 scenario unfolds. Plastic guns, increasingly compact explosives and wireless handheld devices that can invade and override in-flight computer systems will eventually foster another tragic disaster.

At that time, the American public can ask their political leaders, “How are you? And Where are you coming from?”

Dan Stoneking/FEMA

This week marks the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s first Tsunami Awareness Week, continuing their educational approach to “March Madness” regarding water-related disasters.

After the Dec. 26, 2004, devastating tsunami that killed more than 300,000 people in Indonesia, NOAA stepped up efforts to protect America, as well as Pacific Rim’s coastlines, by deploying a series of Deep-ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunami buoys, better known as DART. The system is designed to capture fluctuations in wave heights after a natural disaster, such as an earthquake, and report back to NOAA sites in Alaska, Hawaii and the Caribbean.

The buoy warnings can be provided within minutes, allowing citizens ample time to seek shelter or, at the very least, leave the beach areas. Islands such as Hawaii and Indonesia, however, have few places to hide from tsunamis, prompting local governments to develop much-needed planning and mitigation efforts.

The threat of tsunamis rattled the nerves of those living in the Pacific Rim after the 8.8-magnitude earthquake struck Chile Feb. 27. The series of buoys picked up disturbances in the ocean waves and relayed information to the Hawaii Islands. The system worked and allowed residents the opportunity at “real-time” practice of what to do during a tsunami event. Fortunately, the tsunami wave never developed into the catastrophic one that struck Indonesia.

Rattled, but unnerved, residents of Hawaii and the Pacific Rim are better prepared for a major disaster when it strikes. After participating in what would be called a full-scale exercise, residents took it seriously. This was better than any planned exercise could hope for, because one factor always is absent during training, and that factor is fear.

For more information on Tsunami Awareness Week, click here.

Adam DuBrowa/FEMA

This week marks national Flood Safety Awareness Week and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and The Klaxon encourage individuals to take initiatives to prepare for potential flood.

Some of these initiatives include NOAA’s Turn Around Don’t Drown (TADD), a campaign to warn people of the hazards of walking or driving a vehicle through flood waters.

Safety rules from NOAA include:

Monitor the NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards, or your favorite news source for vital weather related information.

If flooding occurs, get to higher ground. Get out of areas subject to flooding. This includes dips, low spots, canyons, washes, etc.

Avoid areas already flooded, especially if the water is flowing fast. Do not attempt to cross flowing streams.

Road beds may be washed out under flood waters. NEVER drive through flooded roadways.

Do not camp or park your vehicle along streams and washes, particularly during threatening conditions.

Be especially cautious at night when it is harder to recognize flood dangers.

In addition to possible manmade floods as pipes burst, etc., floods also are primarily a result of Mother Nature. These include torrential rains, hurricanes, cyclones and snowmelt. The latter usually results in relatively minor damage and tends to affect localized areas. View the snowmelt formula here.

The most important way to protect your property from flood is flood insurance. The U.S. has the National Flood Insurance Program that allows property owners and communities to purchase insurance from the government against losses caused from flooding. A wise decision, as only two inches of water in your home can cost $7,800 or more in damage. More here.

NOAA helps answer questions in regard to flood safety here. These include the difference between flash flood and flood, knowing how severe a flood will be and how to prepare for minor, moderate and major flooding.

To request more information on the NFIP or NOAA flood preparedness, e-mail inquiries@theklaxon.com.

In an effort to divert Iran’s citizens from the political turmoil that is occurring inside of the country, Iranian leaders are scrambling to re-establish their best defense yet—the resurrection of the bogeymen—Israel and the United States.

“Little Satan” and “Great Satan” make for great illusionary enemies of the Islamic Republic of Iran. However, most of the world sees through their thin veil of radicalism.

Iran probably is not as close to a nuclear bomb as they want the rest of the world to think. But, by ramping up the enrichment of uranium and, therefore, the rhetoric, they have garnered much attention from the West.

Nobody—not even Russian—wants to see them with an atomic weapon. It has become a chess match of epic proportions. A wrong move by either side will send reverberations from Moscow to Washington, D.C.

What Iranian’s leaders really are hoping for is that the U.S. and Israel are so spooked that they are provoked to strike Tehran too early. This is the gift that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei wants most.

Both men have their backs against the wall, and in order to save their jobs and maybe even their lives, they must galvanize their people’s attention in a direction other than towards their shaky government. The crackdown on political dissidents in Iran has not helped their cause.

Iran is infamously known as the greatest sponsor of terror in the world and they are living up that reputation.

Khamenei recently visited with a top leader of Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, while Ahmadinejad met with the Syrian president, as well as Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah.

By attempting to solidify the enemies of Israel under one banner, Iran’s leaders are taking a calculated risk. Both Hamas and Hezbollah are not the same terrorist organizations they were several years ago—both have gone political with their fight and both have drawn the ire of al-Qaeda number two chieftain Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, for being “soft.”

To add to Iran’s woes, there is a tremendous American military presence in the region that is pressing on Iran like a vice. Americans on the west and east borders of Iran can strike all parties involved at anytime and anyplace.

The gig is up and Iran’s leaders know it.