DECON and CBRNE treatment of the masses: nuclear, explosives

By Tom Carey / tom@theklaxon.com / 04.01.2010

Updated on: 04.01.10 at 10:19 am

Antwain Graham/DVIDS

[Editor's note: This is part two of three in a series on Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive preparedness. Part three will publish April 7.]

Since the response issues, identification and procedures in handling CBRNE issues vary, this article will address each of these concerns individually, followed by recovery actions and planning ahead.

Nuclear Attack

Although nuclear weapons pose the least credible threat since they are both difficult to obtain as well as employ, this type of threat must be considered. In May 1997, former Soviet National Security Advisor Alexander Lebed, addressed a U.S. Congressional committee in a closed door session and stated, “There were approximately a hundred small nuclear weapons referred to as suitcase nukes unaccounted for when the Soviet Union collapsed.” According to some repoorts, these devices probably were replicated by the Russians after the Special Atomic Demolition Munition (SADM) found in the U.S. weapons inventory during the 1960s through the 1980s.

On Sept. 7, 1997, in an interview with CBS newsmagazine’s correspondent Steve Kroft, Lebed repeated that 100 of 250 suitcase nuclear-sized bombs were missing and no longer in control of the Russian military. Over the next several years, the controversy raged as to the possibilities of terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda obtaining a suitcase nuclear device.

The ability to acquire radioactive materials from any number of industrial, educational or scientific sources and the combination of this material to produce an explosion must remain a national concern to protect the populace.

An attack on a nuclear facility provides another means of causing a radiological contamination to a widescale area. Terrorists may breach security through a direct assault to an installation or gain entry by means of collusion with existing employees.

The results of a nuclear attack would prove devastating to the population at large, as well effect the economy, the dispensing of proper medical care and ability of municipalities and states to properly govern. The 1986 Chernobyl accident at a nuclear power station—although not a terrorist incident—proves this theory true.

The best defense in this matter relies on a good offense. Continuous aggressive intelligence and counter-intelligence activities conducted by various governmental agencies is the best option to mitigate these type of threats.

Explosives (High Yield)

Terrorists continue to use  high yield explosives and incendiary devices as a  prime choice of weapons from their arsenal as a means of intimidation. In April 1995, a domestic terrorist parked a truck bomb at the base of the Alfred P. Murrah building and detonated the truck bomb with a timed fuse. High explosives are designed to shatter and destroy; this process is initiated by the shock of a detonator.

High explosives fall into three categories: Primary (various mixed chemical compounds), secondary (TNT, PETN, C4 and dynamite to name a few well known to the public), and tertiary (ANFO, used in Oklahoma City bombing in 1995).

Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) usually are constructed from available resources of the designer. The most common explosive of of this type is a pipe bomb that is filled with black or smokeless powders.

After the events of Sept. 11 became clear by the carnage unleashed by al-Qaeda, the U.S. quickly learned how their operatives had factored in the use of jet fuel as a major component of their means of attack. With this said, liquified natural gas (LNG) must also be considered as a significant potential threat for high yield explosives. A Sandia National Laboratories report considered four ways of a terrorist attack against a tanker: (1) ramming with another large ship or vessel, (2) triggered explosion, such as a sub-surface mine, (3) an external assault with an explosive charge and (4) a hijacking.

A high yield explosion likely is to overwhelm a municipality’s resources within a short period of time. It is imperative municipality leaders establish, train and maintain an effective mutual aid program with agency counterparts in their surrounding counties. Other counties can assist your local government in maintaining the continuity of emergency operations and provide needed support to an affected area.

Secondary Devices/Scene Control

Emergency managers must  anticipate the possible detonation of a secondary explosive device when one has gone off and their personnel are responding to the scene.

The bombing of an occupied Sandy Springs family-planning clinic in Atlanta in January 1997 targeted responding emergency personnel and investigators from both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, after the initial blast. One month later in February 1997, a similar incident took place in the same city when a nightclub was bombed. A secondary device was discovered. Apparently, first responders were the target when a backpack later was discovered again after the initial blast had taken place.

Scene control is critical. The initial units responding to the blast site must establish control—regardless of agency. Once law enforcement entities begin to arrive, they can assist other fire and EMS entities in establishing and taking control of perimeters. Proper coordination with the police/sheriff’s bomb squad is key in addressing the possibility of an actual secondary device and the advancement toward the inner perimeter for vital reasons.

To ensure safety of both first responders and properly retrieving injured victims to safe areas, this coordination should take place before accessing the inner perimeter or seat of the blast. Most fire departments have an agreement with their police counterparts to await the arrival of the bomb squad to address explosive devices.

Inter-agency drills for explosion scenarios should be part of any municipality’s training curriculum. Getting each agency to work through this type of joint exercise together will better assist emergency managers in facilitating each agency’s interoperability with one another. Better communication and common bonds likely will be achieved to support one another during times of crisis where time is of the essence.

Read part one here.